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Merger Control Under China’s Anti-Monopoly
Law
SHAOPING CHEN
Introduction
China’s merger control once applied only to circumstances where
foreign companies sought to buy Chinese companies.1 However, since
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) 2 was enacted in August 2008,
China has established a merger control regime that applies generally to
both foreign and Chinese companies. For example, even an offshore
merger transaction that ostensibly has little connection to China is now
subject to China’s merger control if the transaction meets certain turnover
thresholds 3 and other criteria specified in the AML. The Ministry of
Commerce of China (“MOFCOM”), which is primarily in charge of the
AML’s merger control regime, has been very active in enforcing merger
control over offshore transactions.4 China's merger review regime has
rapidly become an important regulatory obstacle for both China-specific
and global merger transactions.5 Additionally, the growing globalization
and importance of China’s economy is forcing more and more
multinational companies to take the merger control regime seriously.6
The main objective of this article is to explore current practices and
procedures of China’s merger control regime that have developed under the
AML. Part I provides a brief overview of the merger control regime under
AML. Part II discusses the transactions that trigger China’s merger control
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Waiguo Touzhizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding (යனእᅜᢞ ⪅ᖼ ቃෆ ⓗ ᐃ)
[Regulation on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors]
(promulgated and amended by MOFCOM, State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Commission of
the State Council (“SASAC”), State Admin. of Taxation (“SAT”), SAIC, CSRC and State Admin. of
Foreign Exch. (“SAFE”), Jun. 22, 2009, effective Jun. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/f/200907/20090706416939.html [hereinafter Foreign M & A
Regulation].
2
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa (୰ ேẸඹᅜ ᩿ἲ) [Anti-Monopoly Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2007-10/09/content_5374672.htm; translation at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm [hereinafter AML].
3
Turnover includes revenues derived from the sales of products or provision of services deducting
relevant taxes and fees. See infra Part II B.
4
Peter Wang, et al., China Merger Review: A New Gauntlet for Global M&A, 15 M & A LAW, no. 8,
2011 at 1.
5
Id.
6
See Adam W. Himmelberger, Tripartite Convergence for Certainty in Merger Review Under China's
Anti-Monopoly Law, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L. REV. 289, 310 (2010).!
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regulations. Part III outlines the pre-merger notification process under the
AML. Part IV analyzes the substantive assessment criteria under the AML
and MOFCOM’s relevant practices. Part V explores remedies that may be
imposed by MOFCOM. Finally, Part VI concludes that parties to a
relevant merger transaction should be aware of the potential impact of
China’s merger review regime and, accordingly, should plan their Chinese
merger notifications carefully.
I.

History and Overview of China’s Merger Control Regime
A.

The Pre-AML Merger Control Regime in China

Prior to the adoption of the AML, China had a merger review
system in place under Foreign M & A Regulation, which came into force in
2003.7 Before the implementation of the current AML, the Foreign M & A
Regulation applied only to acquisitions of domestic enterprises by
foreigners and international mergers.8 The Foreign M & A Regulation, as
amended in 2006, contained two anti-concentration clauses that established
a pre-merger review system in which relevant parties to a merger had to
submit an explanatory report to MOFCOM and China’s State
Administration of Industry and Commerce for approval if the merger meets
certain statutory notification thresholds.9 After the AML came into effect,
MOFCOM amended the Foreign M & A Regulation on June 22, 2009 and
deleted the anti-concentration clauses due to inconsistencies between the
merger control part of the Foreign M & A Regulation and the AML.10
Since then, the AML has been China’s only statutory source of pre-merger
review control, applying to all kinds of mergers and acquisitions, whether
carried out by foreign or domestic enterprises.11
B.

Overview of Merger Control Regime under the AML

The AML is generally consistent with competition laws of the
European Union (“EU”) and the US.12 The AML basically follows the
patterns of EU competition law, prohibiting cartel behavior, abuses of a
dominant position, anti-competitive agreements, and anti-competitive
7

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Foreign M & A Regulation, supra note 1.
8
TAO JINGZHOU & OWEN NEE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: BUSINESS LAWS OF CHINA § 12:4 (2011
ed.).
9
Id.
10
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. et al., Antimonopoly Law, in KENNETH A. CUTSHAW ET. AL., CORPORATE
COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, § 12:32 (3d ed. 2012).
11
Id.
12
See DAVID J. GERBER, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization 234 (Oxford 2010).
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mergers.13 Such business conduct is also regulated under US competition
law.14 However, diverging from the American antitrust policy, the AML
explicitly incorporates non-competition factors into its analysis, such as
whether a transaction advances the healthy development of a socialist
market economy.15
Chapter 4 of the AML, “Concentration of Undertakings,” sets forth
the Chinese merger control scheme.16 According to the AML, transactions
that meet the filing thresholds cannot be implemented until they are cleared
by MOFCOM or until the deadlines for MOFCOM review have lapsed.17
Again, this mandatory notification system established by the AML
essentially follows the EU’s pre-merger notification model.18 As of March
25, 2013, MOFCOM has reviewed 581 concentration transactions; it
cleared 562 transactions unconditionally, approved 18 transactions with
restrictive conditions, and prohibited one transaction. 19 However,
prohibitions and conditional clearances represent less than 3.28 percent of
all MOFCOM's merger decisions under the AML. Therefore, despite
concerns from outside observers, the proportion of prohibitions and
conditional approvals is largely consistent with other major jurisdictions.20
Notably, a majority of the transactions on which MOFCOM
imposed restrictive conditions were offshore transactions between foreign
parties.21 In several cases, MOFCOM even imposed remedies where the
EU and US regulators on the same deal either had not imposed remedies or

13

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Id.; AML, supra note 2, arts. 13-31.
14
See Susan Beth Farmer, The Impact of China's Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S.
Companies, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 34, 35-36 (2010).!
15
Id. at 35-36.
16
AML, supra note 2, arts. 20-31.
17
Id. arts. 26-31.!
18
Joel Mitnick, et al., The Dragon Rises: China's Merger Control Regime One Year on, 23 ANTITRUST
53, 53 (2009).
19
The numbers are calculated by the author based on several press releases issued by the MOFCOM.
See Press Release, MOFCOM, Statistical Information of Concentration Transactions Cleared
Unconditionally (Nov. 11, 2012), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/201211/20121108437868.html; Press Release, MOFCOM, A
List of Concentration Transactions Cleared Unconditionally in the Fourth Quarter of 2012 (Jan. 6,
2013), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201301/20130108512781.shtml; Press
Release, MOFCOM, A List of Concentration Transactions Cleared Unconditionally in the First Quarter
of 2013 (April. 2, 2013), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201304/20130400075697.shtml; Press Release, MOFCOM,
Publication of Decisions of Conditional Clearance Cases (April. 23, 2013), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/.
20
Wang, supra note 4, at 1.
21
See U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service, Doing Business in China-2012: Country Commercial
Guide for U.S. Companies, EXPORT, 86,
http://export.gov/china/build/groups/public/@eg_cn/documents/webcontent/eg_cn_025684.pdf (last
visited May 23, 2013).
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had imposed different remedies.22 Examples of such transactions include
the hard disk drive mergers of Samsung and Seagate, Western Digital and
Hitachi, as well as the Google and Motorola acquisition.23
The review process in specific cases continues to be relatively
opaque. For example, the AML requires only negative decisions to be
published,24 and some of the decisions published by the MOFCOM are too
brief to provide a transparent and convincing analysis about how
MOFCOM reached its conclusions.25 Although the AML also includes a
controversial provision providing that if a transaction raises national
security concerns, an independent national security review shall be
imposed,26 MOFCOM has never explicitly addressed this as grounds for its
published decisions. 27 On February 12, 2011, China’s State Council
released new rules setting up a national security review system.28 The
system aims to screen mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by
foreign investors that impact Chinese national security.29 On the one hand,
the new rules raise concerns among foreign investors worried that Chinese
authorities may use the new rules as a weapon to advance its protectionism
on the area of mergers and acquisitions.30 On the other hand, the new rules
help to clarify what transactions may trigger national security review, and
22

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The M & A Lawyer Interview: A Talk on Bric Merger Regimes, 16 M & A LAW, no. 6, 2012, at 11.
See also Antitrust Alert: China Conditionally Approves Seagate Acquisition of Samsung Hard Drive
Business, Jones Day (Jan. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-conditionallyapproves-seagate-acquisition-of-samsung-hard-drive-business-01-03-2012/ (last visited May. 19, 2013);
Ninette Dodoo & Angie Ng, Assessment of Information Technology Mergers in China, COMPETITION
POLICY INT’L, INC. (2012), http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/AsiaColumn-China-Merger.pdf (last visited May 20, 2013).
23
MOFCOM imposed conditions on the Samsung/Seagate and the Google/Motorola transactions while
the EU and US cleared the transactions unconditionally. In the Western Digital/Hitachi merger, the EU
and US imposed less stringent remedies than that of China. For detailed instruction, see infra Part VB.
24
AML, supra note 2, art. 30.
25
Farmer, supra note 14, at 49-50. See also Yee Wah Chin, The Chinese MOFCOM Enforces Telecoms
Regulations in AML Merger Review (Wal-Mart/Yihaodian) (Jan. 16, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2260474.
26
AML, supra note 2, art. 31.
27
Since the AML came into effect, the MOFCOM had published 19 decisions as of March 25, 2013.
None of them explicitly mentioned “social security.” The decisions are available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ (last visited May 22, 2013).
28
Guanyu Jianli Waiguo Touzhizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Anquan Shencha Zhidu de Tongzhi (යனᘓ
❧እᅜᢞ ⪅ᖼ ቃෆ Ᏻ
ไᗘⓗ㏻▱) [Notice of the State Council’s General Office on
Establishing the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors](promulgated by State Council’s General Office), Feb. 03, 2011, effective Mar. 04,
2011) available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-02/12/content_1802467.htm [hereinafter Security
Review Notice].
29
Id.
30
See Frank Schoneveld & Brian Fu, China’s New Merger Control Regime Makes Major Progress in
Its First Three Years, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8d61b530-8bdc-4064-a19d-f9510e08b4d3 (last visited
May 23, 2013).
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offer MOFCOM an opportunity to enforce merger control solely on
antitrust grounds with regard to the vast majority of mergers and
acquisitions by foreign investors that are unlikely to trigger the security
review.31
II.

Transactions Subject to MOFCOM Review

China's merger review scheme is a mandatory pre-closing
notification and approval process.32 Where parties implement a transaction
without approval, MOFCOM is entitled to order the parties to unwind the
transaction, and the parties may also be fined of up to RMB 500,000
(approximately U.S. $80,000).33 Transactions that meet the statutory filing
thresholds under the AML must be notified to MOFCOM and cannot be
implemented until MOFCOM approves the transactions or until the
deadlines for MOFCOM review are expired.34 According to the AML, a
transaction must be notified to MOFCOM if (1) the transaction constitutes
a “concentration," and (2) certain turnover thresholds are met. 35 This
section will first explore what constitutes a “concentration” under the AML,
followed by an introduction to the turnover thresholds required to trigger
the AML’s merger review.
A.

Concentration-Reportable Transactions
1.

“Concentrations” Under the AML

Under the AML, only transactions that qualify as a "concentration"
require notification to MOFCOM. For the purposes of the AML,
concentrations include the following: “(1) merger of undertakings; (2) an
undertaking’s gain of control over other undertakings through acquiring
their shares or assets; and (3) an undertaking’s gain of control over or the
ability to exert decisive influence on other undertakings by contracts or
other means.”36
Neither the AML nor its relevant implementation rules clearly
specify what constitutes “control” or “decisive influence” for the purposes
31

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

See Security Review Notice, supra note 28.
32
AML, supra note 2, art. 21.
33
Id. art. 48.
34
Id.
35
AML, supra note 2, arts. 20-21.
36
Id. art. 20. According to Article 12 of the AML, an undertaking refers to a natural person, legal
person, or any other organization that engages in manufacturing or operating commodities or providing
services.
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of defining a concentration.37 Therefore, the assessment of control or
decisive influence requires a case-by-case analysis.
According to
MOFCOM’s published decisions, MOFCOM holds that the acquisition of
minority interests and at least certain types of joint venture transactions
constitute concentrations. 38 In practice, to decide whether a merger
transaction constitutes a concentration that must be notified to MOFCOM
under the AML, parties to the transaction may have to engage informal prefiling consultation with MOFCOM to ascertain it.39
2.

The Role of Minority Interests in Concentrations

The lack of a clear definition of “control” leads to uncertainties as
to what extent the acquisition of minority interests constitutes a
concentration. In addition, the AML does not contain a safe harbor
provision that ensures acquisitions of minority interests below a certain
level (holding 20 percent of all shares or less, for example) will not trigger
a notification requirement. MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decision on
the Alpha V/Savio acquisition shows that acquiring a minority interest as
low as 27.9 percent could be held as gaining “control.”40 According to the
MOFCOM decision, Savio, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, had more
than half of the global market share for electronic yarn clearers used for
automatic winding machines.41 MOFCOM determined that the rest of that
market was held by Uster Technologies AG (“Uster”), of which Alpha V
was the largest shareholder, holding a 27.9 percent minority interest.42
MOFCOM stated that the issue in the transaction was whether
Alpha V would be able to use its minority holdings in Uster to coordinate
the operations of Savio and Uster “to eliminate or restrict” competition.43
MOFCOM decided that it was possible for Alpha V to do so and
determined that the proposed transaction may have the effect of eliminating
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37

See Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Banfa (
⪅㞟୰⏦
ἲ)) [Measures on the Notification of
Concentrations between Undertakings], (promulgated by MOFCOM, Nov. 21, 2009, effective Jan. 1
2010), art. 3, available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200901/20090106011461.html
[hereinafter MOFCOM Notification Rules]. Article 3 of the Notification Rules was supposed to clarify
the concepts of “control” and “decisive influence.” However, it merely reiterates Article 20 of the
AML without providing more guidance.
38
See Norton Rouse, Antimonopoly Law in China (Mar. 2012), www.nortonrose.com/files/downloadantimonopoly-law-in-china-63824.pdf (last visited May 23, 2012).
39
HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:34.!
40
Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2011] No. 73, Oct. 31, 2011, available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201111/20111107855585.html [hereinafter Alpha V/Savio].
For comments on the decision, see Jim O'Connell, The Year of the Metal Rabbit: Antitrust Enforcement
in China in 2011, 26 ANTITRUST 65, 69 (2012).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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or restricting competition.44 Therefore MOFCOM required Alpha V to
divest its Uster holdings as a condition for clearing the transaction.45
It is worth emphasizing that according to a literal analysis of the
MOFCOM’s decision, MOFCOM concluded that Alpha V was able to
control Uster, not because it positively found evidence for such control, but
simply because MOFCOM could not rule out such possibility. 46
MOFCOM’s approach in the Alpha V/Savio decision indicated that
MOFCOM has extensive discretion in deciding whether an acquisition of
minority interests constitutes an “acquisition of control” and consequently
triggers notification duty under the AML. 47 Accordingly, parties to
acquisition of minority interest should be aware that their transaction may
constitute a concentration requiring notification to MOFCOM, especially
where the minority interest is significant enough to enable the acquirer to
potentially control the acquired business or entity.48
3.

Joint Ventures as Concentrations

Neither the AML nor its relevant implementation rules expressly
provide whether the creation of a joint venture by two or more
undertakings constitutes a type of concentration. However, it is clear that
in practice MOFCOM takes the view that the creation of a new joint
venture is subject to merger control under the AML. 49 For example,
MOFCOM conditionally approved the GE/Shenhua joint venture
transaction in 2011,50 and the Henkel/Tiande joint venture transaction in
2012.51 In these two published decisions, MOFCOM explicitly stated that
the creation of the joint venture in each of the cases constituted a
“concentration.”52

44

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Id.
45
!Id.!
46
See Michael Han & Margaret Wang, Key Trends in PRC Merger Control over the Last Year (Aug. 08,
2012), www.freshfields.com/knowledgedetail.aspx?id=2147933806 (last visited May 23, 2013).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See O'Connell, supra note 41, at 69.
50
Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2011] No. 74, Nov. 10, 2011, available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201111/20111107855595.html [hereinafter GE/Shenhua]. The
GE/Shenhua case is first published case involving establishment of a joint venture in China. It is also
the only conditional clearance case involving a Chinese state owned enterprise. For more detailed
information of this case, see O'Connell, supra note 41, at 71-72.
51
Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2012] No. 6, Feb. 10, 2011, available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201202/20120207960466.html [hereinafter Henkel/Tiande].!
52
Had it not held that the creation of the two joint ventures involved in the two cases constituted
concentrations, MOFCOM would not have reviewed the two transactions, not to mention imposed
conditions on their approval.

!
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Exemption from MOFCOM Review

A notification to MOFCOM is not required under two
circumstances: (1) when an undertaking involved in the concentration
already holds fifty percent or more of the voting shares or assets of each of
the other undertakings involved in the concentration; or (2) when an
undertaking not involved in the concentration holds fifty percent or more of
the voting shares or assets of each of the undertakings involved in the
concentration.53 Therefore, certain internal group consolidations among
affiliates without change of ultimate control are expressly exempted from
the pre-transaction notification requirement under the AML.
B.

Turnover Thresholds

The AML directs the China State Council to set the MOFCOM
notification thresholds. 54 According to Regulations on Notification
Thresholds adopted by the China State Council in 2008, 55 whether a
concentration shall be notified to MOFCOM is based on an objective
standard of worldwide turnover and China-wide turnover, not on the nexus
of the transaction to China.56 According to the MOFCOM's Notification
Rules, turnover includes revenues derived from the sales of products or the
provision of services after deducting relevant taxes and fees. 57 The
turnover thresholds under the AML are designed to establish jurisdiction
and not to assess the relative market position of the parties involved in the
concentration or the impact of the transaction on the relative market.58
Whether the transaction will be consummated within or outside China is
irrelevant to the reporting thresholds.59 Thus, transactions that may appear
to have little or no impact on China may still subject to the reporting
requirements if the parties to the transactions have substantial turnover in
China. 60 Pursuant to the Regulation on Notification Thresholds, prior
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53

AML, supra note 2, art. 22.
Id. art. 21.
!Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Biaozhun de Guiding (ᅜ 㝔යன
⪅㞟୰⏦
ⓗ ᐃ) [Regulations of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of
Concentrations of Undertakings], (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 3, 2008, effective Aug. 3,
2008), art. 3, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-08/04/content_1063769.htm; translation at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200903/20090306071501.html [hereinafter Regulations on
Notification Thresholds].!
56
Farmer, supra note 14, at 36; see also Christopher Hamp-Lyons, The Dragon in the Room: China's
Anti-Monopoly Law and International Merger Review, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1607 (2009) (analyzing
concerns about China’s notification thresholds without requiring a “nexus of transaction to China”).
57
MOFCOM Notification Rules, supra note 38, art. 4.
58
Harris et al., supra note 10, § 12:37.
59
Id.
60
Id.
54

""

No. 2

Merger Control in China

187

notification to MOFCOM is required for concentrations meeting either of
the following thresholds:
(1) the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings
concerned in the preceding financial year is more than
RMB 10 billion yuan [approximately U.S. $1.5 billion],
and the nationwide turnover within China of each of at
least two of the undertakings concerned in the preceding
financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan
[approximately U.S. $60 million]; or
(2) the combined nationwide turnover within China of all
undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year is
more than RMB 2 billion yuan [approximately U.S. $300
million], and the nationwide turnover within China of each
of at least two undertakings concerned in the preceding
financial year is more than RMB 400 million yuan
[approximately U.S. $60 million].61
1.

Calculation of Turnover

MOFCOM's Notification Rules provide further, though limited,
guidance on calculating turnover. Initially MOFCOM took the position
that turnover shall be calculated using the combined turnover of all related
undertakings under common control with, or of, the parties involved in the
transaction. 62 The combined turnover is calculated across all types of
products sold by all undertakings within the group, not merely those
involved in the proposed transaction.63
The MOFCOM Notification Rules, however, narrowed the scope
of the seller's turnover for the purpose of pre-merger review. 64 The
method for calculating turnover of the merging parties or the acquirer in an
acquisition remains the same: for them, the sales revenues must include the
turnover of the entire corporate group.65 In contrast, for the seller in an
acquisition of part of a business, only the sales of businesses affected by
the proposed transaction (i.e., the target) shall be included.66 The parties to
the concentration should include any special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) as

61

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Regulations on Notification Thresholds, supra note 55, art. 3.
#$
!HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:37. !
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
HARRIS, supra note 10, § 12:37.
66
MOFCOM Notification Rules, supra note 38, arts. 4, 7.

!
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well as the ultimate shareholders of such SPV.67 MOFCOM has also
established special rules for calculating the relevant turnovers of financial
companies.68
2.

MOFCOM’s Discretionary Power

Even if a concentration does not satisfy the above-mentioned
turnover thresholds, MOFCOM has the discretionary power to investigate
the concentration if it believes the concentration may result in the
elimination or restriction of competition in the Chinese domestic market.69
However, it is not clear what standard of evidence must be met for
MOFCOM to conclude that a concentration is likely to restrict or eliminate
competition and therefore launch an investigation. Concerns of outside
investors are naturally raised about MOFCOM’s potential ability to abuse
this discretionary power.70 It is worth noting that so far MOFCOM has not
used these discretionary powers.71
III.

The Notification Process

MOFCOM’s Notification Rules require specific procedures for
notification and review of transactions triggering reporting thresholds.
This section discusses some of those requirements, including: who has the
duty to file; when shall the transaction be filed; what materials must be
submitted; and MOFCOM’s timetable for review.
A.

The Filing Party

Although the AML is silent on which party or parties have the
obligation to file a notification with MOFCOM, the MOFCOM
Notification Rules state that the parties to a merger shall be responsible for
filing.72 For other types of concentrations, the undertaking gaining control
or decisive influence (the notifying party) shall be responsible for filing.73
67

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

See Shang Ming’s Speech on China Renmin University’s International Anti-Monopoly Forum,
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW (May 7, 2011), http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/article/default.asp?id=3227.
68
Jinrongye Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Yingyee Jisuan Banfa (㔠⼥
⪅㞟୰⏦
⟬
ἲ) [The Rules on Turnover Calculation for Concentration of Financial Undertakings] (promulgated
by the MOFCOM, PBC, CBRC, CSRC and CIRC, Jul. 15, 2009, effective Aug. 15, 2009), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200907/20090706411691.html.!
69
Regulations on Notification Thresholds, supra note 55, art. 4.
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The Timing of Filing

There is no fixed deadline for submitting the notification. The
AML provides that a proposed transaction should not be closed before
MOFCOM grants its approval.74 Therefore, parties are encouraged to file
as early as practicable.75 MOFCOM typically requires executed copies of
the transaction documents before it will accept a notification.76
C.

Required Notification Materials

The AML provides a general list of information and documents
requested for the filing, including: (1) a notification/ letter; (2) an
explanation of the of the effects that the concentration may have on the
competition in relevant markets; (3) the merger or acquisition agreement or
other transaction documents; (4) audited financial statements for all
undertakings involved in the concentration for the previous accounting year;
and (5) other information required by MOFCOM. 77 Article 10 of the
MOFCOM Notification Rules provides more detail on information
requirements, including: (1) Basic information about the parties and
detailed ownership structure of the parties and its ultimate parent entities;
(2) Information on relevant markets and competition. The parties must
submit an explanation of the effects that the proposed transaction may have
on the competition in any relevant markets; (3) Information on the
transaction, including the transaction agreements and relevant documents;

74
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MOFCOM Filing Guidelines provide more detailed guidance on the information and documents
required for filing. The MOFCOM Filing Guidelines (in Chinese) are available at
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the Amended and Re-issued Standard Notification Form (Jun. 6, 2012), available at
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(4) Audited financial statements of the parties for the latest fiscal year; and
(5) Any other information requested by the reviewing authorities.78
As indicated above, the AML merger control process requires the
notifying parties to submit a very substantial amount of materials. In
practice, MOFCOM applies a uniform materials requirement to all types of
concentrations that require notification, regardless of their potential impact
on competition.79 In contrast, the U.S. process has far more simplified
document requirements in its initial review. The U.S. antitrust authority
will require detailed information only if the initial review raises
competition concerns. 80 While the EU’s information requirements are
more similar to that of China than that of the U.S.,81 the EU has a less
burdensome and more simplified procedure for non-problematic
transactions.82 Therefore, the document and information requirements of
the China merger control regime may more burdensome than those of the
EU and U.S., especially where transactions involved have no or very
limited concentration problems. 83 To lower the risk of a rejection,
notifying parties sometimes have to submit substantial amounts of
information from the outset, even where such information may not be
entirely necessary for MOFCOM to examine the transaction adequately
from the antitrust perspective.84
D.
1.

Timetable for Review
The Pre-Consultation Phase

In practice, the MOFCOM merger review process generally
consists of two stages: the pre-consultation phase and the formal review
phase. In most cases, a first attempt to submit a merger filing to
MOFCOM will not start the 30-day initial waiting period. Instead,
MOFCOM typically will review and identify deficiencies in the filing,
request additional information or documentation, and discuss key

78
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substantive issues with parties.85 The formal review phases do not start
until MOFCOM has accepted the notification as complete.86 Additionally,
MOFCOM does not yet have a short-form application or expedited review
process.87
The standard for “completeness” of a notification is highly
subjective and determined solely at MOFCOM’s discretion.88 The preconsultation process “may take weeks or even months, depending on the
availability of MOFCOM anti-monopoly staff, the complexity of the issues
involved, and other factors.”89 For example, the pre-consultation process
took a month and a half in the InBev/Anheuser-Busch decision;90 fifty-two
days in the Google/Motorola decision; 91 and two months in the CocaCola/Huiyuan decision.92 However, because these transactions resulted in
negative MOFCOM decisions, they may represent longer pre-consultation
periods than those of normal cases.93 The unpredictability of the preconsultation process will continue to be a concern for international
transactional antitrust lawyers and their clients.94
2.

The Formal Review Phases

When MOFCOM determines that the filing is “complete,” the
formal review phase begins. According to the AML, the timetable for
MOFCOM’s review proceeds as described below.
a.

Phase One of MOFCOM Review

MOFCOM’s initial review period, Phase One, lasts up to 30 days95
after a filing is accepted as complete. If MOFCOM does not issue a
decision within the 30-day time limit, the transaction is considered
85
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InBev/Anheuser Busch].
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Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2012] No. 25 (“Google/Motorola Decision”) (May. 19, 2012),
available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/201205/20120508134324.html [hereinafter
Google/Motorola].
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Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2009] No. 22 (“Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Decision”) (Mar. 18,
2009), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html [hereinafter
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan].
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approved and the parties may close their transaction.96 MOFCOM uses this
time to solicit opinions from other government agencies, trade associations,
customers, suppliers, and competitors.97
b.

Phase Two and Phase Three of MOFCOM Review

If MOFCOM has concerns about the transaction, it can initiate a
second stage review, Phase Two, for up to an additional 90 days.98 Under
exceptional circumstances, such as when the parties agree, when
MOFCOM determines that the information provided by the parties was
inaccurate, or when circumstances have significantly changed, a third stage,
Phase Three, extends review for another 60 days.99 For example, in the
Google/Motorola case, MOFCOM exhausted all 180 days of the three
phases.100
During the review process, MOFCOM may investigate a proposed
transaction by requesting information and documentation from the parties;
contacting customers, suppliers, competitors, and other relevant entities or
government agencies; and conducting hearings.101 MOFCOM Notification
Rules provide additional details regarding MOFCOM’s investigative
powers in the merger control process and hearing procedures.102 Notably,
MOFCOM does not need to justify initiating Phase Two or Phase Three
reviews.103 Although, as stated above, MOFCOM’s merger control system
resembles the EU regime, there is an important difference regarding Phase
Two. The European Commission is entitled to initiate second-phase
proceedings only when it has serious doubts about a transaction’s effects on
competition. 104 In contrast, the AML entitles MOFCOM to initiate a
further review without any additional qualification or conditions
attached.105 In practice, entering Phase Two does not necessarily implicate
competition concerns.106 For example, some cases entered Phase Two
simply because MOFCOM could not complete the review in the 30-day
limit of Phase One, partly because MOFCOM is severely understaffed.107
96
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If MOFCOM decides to reject a transaction or approve it subject to
conditions, then it must publish a written decision explaining its
reasoning.108 However, if it approves a transaction unconditionally, then no
public written decision is required; nonetheless, in most circumstances,
MOFCOM will privately issue a written notice of approval to the parties.109
IV.

Substantive Assessment for Reviewing Concentrations

The substantive test in merger control under AML is whether a
notified transaction has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition in China. 110 AML requires MOFCOM to prohibit such a
concentration, unless the parties involved can prove that “the positive effect
of the concentration on competition exceeds the negative effect,” or that the
concentration is in the “public interest.”111
A.

Factors in Substantive Assessment

Article 27 of the AML lists the factors that must be considered in
the review of concentrations, which include: (1) the market share of the
undertakings involved in the relevant market and their ability to control
market; (2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market; (3)
the effect of the concentration on market entry and progress of technology;
(4) the effect of the concentration on consumers and other undertakings; (5)
the effect of the concentration on China’s economic development; and (6)
other factors affecting market competition as determined by MOFCOM.112
Unlike the "significant impediment to competition" test applied in
EU or "substantial lessening of competition" test applied in U.S.,113 the
AML does not expressly provide to what extent a transaction’s negative
impact on competition entails MOFCOM’s prohibition or conditional
approval decision114 Article 28 of the AML only generally provides that if
a concentration results in or may result in the elimination or restriction of
market competition, MOFCOM shall prohibit the concentration.115 If such
concentration results in a more positive than negative effect on competition,
or if it is in the “public interest,” MOFCOM will perform a balancing test
108
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and may decide not to block the concentration.116 In practice, MOFCOM
will block or conditionally clear a transaction if the transaction raises
significant competition concerns. On August 29, 2011, MOFCOM issued
assessment guidelines for the impact of a concentration on competition,
which provide certain specific guidance for MOFCOM to assess
competition effects.117
The decisions published by MOFCOM provide some insight into
how MOFCOM actually applies the substantive assessment factors and
conducts its substantive assessment. While earlier decisions show
MOFCOM’s analysis and reasoning as relatively cursory, recent decisions
show more sophistication and transparency.118 It is not yet clear what role
economic evidence plays in MOFCOM's review.119
B.
1.

Non-Competition Concerns

Non-Competition Factors Incorporated into AML

The AML expressly refers to the consideration of non-competition
factors, which differs from the traditional model of antitrust analysis that
relies solely on competition factors.120 Under the AML, MOFCOM is
empowered, and technically required, to take into account non-competition
factors in its merger review process.121 The AML explicitly states that the
legislative purposes of the statute include advancing the “healthy
development of [a] socialist market economy” and promoting “public
interests.” 122 The AML further empowers the State to “make and
implement” regulations “suitable for the socialist market economy; to
perfect the macro control; and improve a united, open, competitive, and
well-ordered market system.”123 The AML also requires that a separate
review be conducted if the acquisition of a domestic company by a foreign
investor raises national security issues.124 There are concerns that such

116
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non-competition factors may in fact inhibit competition and be abused by
MOFCOM to protect domestic competitors.125
2.

MOFCOM Case Examples

Several of MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decisions and its sole
prohibition decision raised concerns of protectionism from outside
China.126 The prohibition decision of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan raised broad
criticism that MOFCOM used the AML for the purpose of preventing
foreign enterprises from acquiring the famous domestic brand Huiyuan.127
In the decision, MOFCOM stated that it prohibited Coca-Cola’s proposed
U.S. $2.4 billion acquisition of Huiyuan due to competition concerns and
the failure of the parties to agree on a remedy. 128 However, because
Huiyuan is a well-known domestic Chinese brand, foreign investors
suspected that the real reason for the prohibition was that MOFCOM did
not want the famous domestic brand to be acquired by foreign enterprises,
thereby advancing a protectionist agenda.129
Such suspicion was raised partly because the decision was too brief
and lacked a detailed economic analysis regarding the transaction’s impact
on competition.130 MOFCOM identified three main competition concerns
as the basis for rejecting the merger. First, acquiring Huiyuan would
enable Coca-Cola to leverage its dominance in the carbonated soft drinks
market into the juice market and consequently limit competition in the juice
market.131 Second, acquiring the famous brand Huiyuan would strengthen
Coca-Cola’s already powerful control over the juice market and would
raise barriers to small or medium sized domestic enterprises’ entry in the
juice market. 132 Third, the combination of Coca-Cola/Huiyan would
“squeeze out small and medium sized juice producers in China, and restrain
local producers from participating in the juice beverage market or their
ability for proprietary innovation.”133
As indicated above, in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, MOFCOM did take
into account domestic competitors, national economic development, and
negative effects on domestic small and medium-sized juice companies in
125
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its decision. However, MOFCOM also based its decision on the negative
impact of the proposed transaction on competition. Although a lack of
adequate reasoning made its conclusion less convincing, to conclude that
MOFCOM was using the merger review solely as a vehicle to prevent
acquisition of famous domestic brand by a foreign company would be
overstated and hasty.134
Two of MOFCOM’s later decisions suggest that its CocaCola/Huiyuan decision may “have had more to do with the facts of that
case than with a larger economic nationalism agenda.” 135 In 2011,
MOFCOM unconditionally cleared two high-profile acquisitions of famous
domestic enterprises by foreign enterprises. One was the acquisition of
Inner Mongolia-based Little Sheep Group Ltd., the owner of popular hotpot chain restaurants in China, by Yum! Brands Inc., the owner of the KFC,
Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut brands.136 The other was the acquisition by
Nestlé SA of a 60 percent interest in Hsu Fu Chi International.137 Both Hsu
Fu Chi and Little Sheep are well-known Chinese brands. Therefore, it
would appear that foreign takeovers of popular Chinese brands alone do not
raise stricter scrutiny from MOFCOM.138 Indeed Shang Ming, the Director
General of MOFCOM's Anti-Monopoly Bureau, claimed the government
applies the same uniform criteria and denied the suggestion that MOFCOM
enforced the AML to discriminate against foreign companies.139
In cases after Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, MOFCOM has made no
prohibition decision and has been noticeably cautious about imposing
remedies on non-competition grounds.140 Despite that, because of a lack of
transparency and MOFCOM’s relative dependency on China’s central
government, other higher rank administrative departments, and the China’s
Communist Party MOFCOM’s conditional clearance decisions often raise
suspicions of the involvement of non-competition factors.141 For example,
decisions such as Uralkali/Silvinit, where the merged entity would have
accounted for at least half China’s imported volume of potassium chloride,
134
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an important fertilizer and essential for the Chinese agriculture, were at
least partly based on industrial policy concerns rather than competition
concerns.142 Additionally, in the GM/Delphi decision, lobbyists from one
or more Chinese automobile manufacturers and domestic trade associations
reportedly influenced the conditions imposed on the transaction.143 On the
other hand, from a statistical perspective, MOFCOM’s negative decisions
represent less than 3.3 percent of all its decisions under the merger control
regime under AML. 144 Therefore, it is probably safe to say that
MOFCOM’s practices generally are in line with mainstream merger anticompetition control.
V.

Remedies

China’s merger control regime provides for remedies in the form of
conditions upon transactions that may restrict or eliminate competition.
This section introduces the statutory framework of remedies under the
AML. It then explores MOFCOM’s practice of imposing remedies.
A.

Statutory Framework

According to the AML, if a proposed transaction will have the
effect of eliminating or restricting competition, MOFCOM may either
block such transaction, or approve such transaction subject to restrictive
conditions. 145 Blocking decisions and conditional approvals must be
published. 146 The parties are not allowed to close the transaction if
MOFCOM decides to block the deal. Pursuant to the Rules on the Review
of Concentrations between Undertakings (MOFCOM Review Rules), both
the parties and MOFCOM may propose restrictive conditions to eliminate
any anticipated anti-competitive effects from a proposed concentration for
the purpose of clearing a concentration.147
Three types of restrictive conditions may be considered: (1)
structural remedies (e.g., divesture of assets or businesses); (2) behavioral
remedies (e.g., an agreement to license key technologies or to terminate
prior exclusive deal); and (3) combinations of structural and behavioral
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remedies.148 The Provisional Rules on Divesture adopted and published by
MOFCOM in July 2010 provide specific rules for structural remedies.149
The rules mainly cover divestiture procedure, including:
(1) the
appointment of trustees to oversee the voluntary divestiture process carried
out by the party subject to MOFCOM’s decision to divest assets or
business; (2) the procedures for entrusted divesture if the party fails to
divest specified asset or business voluntarily; and (3) the party’s report duty
to MOFCOM regarding compliance with the MOFCOM’s decision.150
B.

Remedies Imposed in MOFCOM’s Decisions

In practice, MOFCOM has wide discretion in determining the
appropriate remedies in a particular case.151 For example, in Pfizer/Wyeth,
Panasonic/Sanyo, and Alpha V/Savio, MOFCOM imposed structural
remedies that required the divesture of certain assets as a condition to
approve the transaction. 152
In GM/Delphi and Google/Motorola,
MOFCOM imposed behavioral remedies, including conditions requiring
the merged entity not to discriminate against upstream or downstream
domestic customers and to maintain existing service levels.153 Similarly, in
GE/Shenhua and Henkel/Tiande, MOFCOM imposed behavioral remedies
designed to maintain the pre-merger market structure and to guarantee
existing levels of supply prior to the transaction. 154 In the case of
Henkel/Tiande, MOFCOM imposed fair and reasonable and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) commitments. 155 In Seagate/Samsung and
Western Digital/HGST, MOFCOM allowed the parties to merger but

148
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required freezing the integration for a period determined by MOFCOM.156
As shown by the above decisions, unlike most antitrust authorities in other
countries, MOFCOM has shown apparent willingness to impose behavioral
remedies.157 In fact, to date it has imposed behavioral remedies in ten out
of seventeen conditional clearance decisions since the AML came into
force.158
MOFCOM is confident in taking its own approach in enforcing
merger control. When imposing remedies, MOFCOM focuses primarily on
the impact of the proposed transactions on the Chinese market, even though
the relevant market may be global.159 Accordingly, imposing remedies,
MOFCOM sometimes sets conditions specific to the Chinese market. For
example, in the GM/Delphi merger, MOFCOM imposed a condition
requiring a party to continue to supply other customers in the Chinese
market.160 In the Uralkali/Silvinit merger, MOFCOM required Russian
potash producers to continue to sell to Chinese customers.161
At times, MOFCOM imposed remedies when EU and U.S.
regulators had not imposed remedies, or had imposed different remedies on
the same deals. 162 For example, in the Seagate/Samsung merger,
MOFCOM required Seagate to establish an independent subsidiary to
produce and sell Samsung products, and to prevent information from being
exchanged between Seagate and the Samsung subsidiary for at least
another year.163 MOFCOM imposed these requirements despite the fact
that U.S. and EU authorities had already cleared the Seagate/Samsung
merger without conditions.164 MOFCOM imposed similar remedies to that
of the Seagate/Samsung case in the Western Digital/Hitachi merger,
requiring Western Digital to treat Hitachi as an independent competitor for
24 months in addition to diverting Hitachi’s 3.5 inch hard disk drive
business, whereas the transaction was cleared in the EU and U.S. with only
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one condition that Western Digital divert Hitachi’s 3.5 inch hard disk drive
business to a third party.165
A more recent example is the Google/Motorola merger case.
Despite the fact that EU and U.S. anti-competition authorities had cleared
the transaction unconditionally, MOFCOM imposed conditions that, among
other things, required Google to continue to license the Android free of
charge and on an open source basis for five years, and treat all downstream
manufactures in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to the Android
Mobile OS for five years.166
Conclusion
China has quickly established itself as one of the major merger
control regimes in the world in a little more than four years since AML
came into effect on August 2008. On one hand, MOFCOM’s approach is
reasonably practical and pragmatic and not a radical departure from that of
more mature jurisdictions, such as that of the EU and U.S. On the other
hand, the new Chinese merger control regime is relatively young and still
lacks transparency. It is not clear to what extent the non-competition
concerns play a role in MOFCOM’s review.
The documentation
requirements under the MOFCOM’s review system are quite burdensome,
and the MOFCOM's review process is likely to take relatively longer than
that of other jurisdictions. It is important for parties to carefully plan their
Chinese notification anticipating and addressing some of these issues at the
outset.

165

Id.
166
Id.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

